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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. By B. James
George, Jr., New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1969. Pp. 413. $15.00.
IRVING YOUNGER*

Within every democrat there rankles a deep-seated distrust of the police.'
It is an essential hedge against Demos rampant. Lacking it, no matter how
kindly their intentions, philosopher, statesman, and judge walk heedless toward
tyranny 2
Even so, not even a Messiah wants a world without constraints.3 The
democrat perforce wastes no time with dreams of anarchy. He takes it for
granted that there must be a department of police, and devotes himself to marking out the limits within which policemen must tread. His purpose is to cabin
their powers, for he knows that if the parish does not govern the constable,
the constable will govern the parish. 4
The American democrat reads his faith in the tables of the law handed
down in 1791. 5 They vibrate with the same fear of law-enforcement that
trembles within him. Thus they decree that there shall be boundaries passing
which a policeman becomes a criminal; 6 further they do not go. Other institutions are left to say where the lines shall fall and to provide means for
redressing any trespass beyond them.7 Turning from the Constitution, the
* Judge, Civil Court of the City of New York; Adjunct Professor of Law, School of
Law, New York University.
1. The perceptive Justice White has seen that the decision in Escobedo rests upon precisely this distrust of the police. Ironically, that is precisely why he condemns it. Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 498 (1964) (White, 3., dissenting). Lest the reader conclude that
Justice White is no democrat, he is reminded that Justice White's dissent in Escobedo-rejecting as irrelevant to a stationhouse interrogation the sixth amendment's right to counsel
but remarking upon the significance of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination-supplied the rationale for the majority's step beyond Escobedo. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). But then, Justice White dissented in Miranda too. Id. at 526.
2. This idea is memorably expressed by W. H. Auden in a stanza of his "Letter to Lord
Byron," part of AuDEN & MAcNEIcE, LETTERS rROm IcELAND (1937):

3.

Banker or landlord, booking-clerk or Pope,
Whenever he's lost faith in choice and thought,
When a man sees the future without hope,
Whenever he endorses Hobbes' report
'The life of man is nasty, brutish, short,'
The dragon rises from his garden border
And promises to set up law and order.
ST. MATTHEw, 22:19-21.
4. Compare W. SnAxEssFz-A,, MuCH Ano ABOUT NOTnmIG, Act III, scene ii:

Dogberry. This is your charge: you shall comprehend all vagrom men: you are to
bid any man stand, in the prince's name.
Watch. How, if a'will not stand?
Dogberry. Why, then, take no note of him, but let him go; and presently call the
rest of the watch together, and thank God you are rid of a knave.
5. The first ten amendments became part of the Constitution on December 15, 1791,
when, after ten other states had done so, Virginia approved them.
6. For example, if any be needed, the fourth and fifth amendments.
7. The practice of totalitarian nations, by contrast, has been to set up several police
departments simultaneously, and to rely upon the resulting strife and contention to keep each
of them in check. See, e.g., W. SHmR, THE RisE AND FALL Or THE TiRD REICH, 120, 215

(1960). For various reasons not to the point here, democracies cannot use that technique.
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democrat looks expectantly to his legislatures. He finds, howev&, that when
the task is bridling the police, they are uncharacteristically diffident and ineffective.8 In the United States, they have failed.9 Instead, the Supreme Court
has drawn the boundaries.' 0 Using the Constitution's orphic generalities as a
foundation, the Court has constructed a code of criminal procedure that surpasses in breadth and in detail any statute in the field."
In one respect at least, the Court's work has been more cribbed than a
legislature's need be. Parliamentary energy may be poured into virtually any
mold ingenuity and sense suggest.' 2 Judicial energy works only in the courtroom; it is impotent on the street or in the stationhouse.13 Since courtrooms
are apt for just one thing-the conduct of trials-the Supreme Court's code of
criminal procedure manifests itself only when criminal cases are tried. It splits
them in two. The first part is a trial on the issue whether the police have
violated the code. If the police are convicted, there is no second part. If the
police are acquitted, the second part follows-a trial on the issue whether the
defendant has violated the substantive law of crimes laid down by the legislature.
About the latter kind of trial there are numerous books. 14 About the former
there has been much miscellaneous material,'5 but nothing clear, compact, co8. Let me touch upon the two main reasons. The democratic legislator must be alert,
first, for the outcries of ignorant demagogy (e.g., the attacks on the Warren Court for
"shackling the police"), and, second, for the more delicate arguments available to a police
department reluctant to be reined (cf. Georges Simenon's novel, THa PamiEt, 48 (Pocket
Books Edition), in which an ambitious French politician chooses "to be Minister of the
Interior, and have the police records at his disposal.").
9. By way of proof and of example, I would ask where were the laws, before Mapp,
giving effect to the fourth amendment, and where the penalties suffered by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for its scandalous violations of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. See A. WEsTN,, PRIVACY A I) FREEo1, 177 (1967); Younger, Laying
Down the Law to Number-One Lawman, New Republic, March 4, 1967, at 11.
10. The Court's march unto the breach left by Congress and the state legislatures is a
complex event. Several forces have shaped it. In addition to distrust of the police, sketched
in this review, there are: (1) the tendency of one institution (the Court) to fill any vacuum
in public affairs left by another (the legislatures) ; (2) the pressure felt throughout the law
to move from rules that are exact but difficult to apply (e.g., a confession shall be admissible
only if it is voluntary) to rules that are absolute and easy to apply (e.g., a confession shall
be admissible only if the police have first said certain things to the suspect) ; and (3) the
suspicion that policemen testify perjuriously in order to avoid the application of rules they
dislike (e.g., if a seizure would be illegal under Mapp, the policeman testifies that the
suspect abandoned the thing seized, hence avoiding the difficulty.). See Younger, The Perjury
Routine, The Nation, May 8, 1967, at 596.
11. I do not, in this brief review, mean to characterize the Supreme Court's work for
good or for ill. My purpose is merely to note what has been done.
12. For example, were a legislature so inclined, it might enact a rule like the rule
of Miranda and provide that if a policeman violates it, he should forfeit one month's salary
to be paid by the public treasury directly to the suspect whose rights have been affronted.
13. The Supreme Court, for example, can tell a trial judge to admit or to exclude a
policeman's testimony. It cannot tell the policeman to do his job in a certain way on pain
of discipline.
14. E.g., J. HlAiL, GEzEzAs PpmzcuLEs or CRnaNAL LAW (2d ed. 1960): CLRx &
ATRsHaar,
Cmms (7th ed. 1967).
15. E.g., Note, Pre-Arrest Delay: Evolving Due Process Standards, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv.
722 (1968): Developments in the Law, Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 935 (1966).
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herent, and comprehensive. Until now. Professor George's book possesses those
four rare virtues,16 and is an indispensable volume for every criminal lawyer.
The author treats in sequence the six major issues with which the Supreme
Court has dealt: search and seizure, the exclusionary rule, wiretapping and
eavesdropping, line-ups and show-ups, the privilege against self-incrimination,
and confessions. As to each, he states the problem, describes the cases in which
the Supreme Court has grappled with it, summarizes enough lower court decisions to give the practitioner a sense of the direction in which the law is moving,
suggests something of how the advocate can turn the rules to his client's advantage, and, where Congress or a state legislature has attempted to modify or
refine doctrine pronounced by the Supreme Court, he lavishes upon the reader
17
in extenso discussion of the statute.
I have used the word "reader" in a Pickwickian sense. Constitutional
Limitations on Evidence in Criminal Cases is not a book to be read straight
through. It conveys much matter with no art. Professor George has none of the
little tricks of seduction that slip a reader smoothly from page to page sans labor,
sans ennui, sans slumber. This, rather, is a book to be consulted. Let a practitioner anticipate that some phenomenon of police conduct will figure in a
trial. Let him find the chapter where George discusses it, and there he will discover everything he must know to do his job intelligently and efficiently. For
that, Professor George deserves the profession's thanks, and those are laurels
enough for any man.
16. It also offers relief to the myopic lawyer weary of volumes printed to be read by
insects. The book is set in visible type with decent margins and plenty of space between
the lines.
17. For example, pages 151 to 183, dealing with wiretapping and electronic surveillance
under the Crime Control Act of 1968, and pages 183 to 193, dealing with New York's statute
on that subject.

